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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant and defendant, Allen Coleman ("Coleman"), found himself stranded 
on State Road 201 on January 7, 1994. (The citations to the record for the undisputed statement 
of material facts have been thoroughly cited in Appellants' and Appellee's briefs, thus, for the 
sake of brevity, Appellants will not cite them again here.) Coleman's vehicle, insured by 
Appellee, Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin ("Viking"), had stalled for the second time 
that day. State Road 201 is a busy, four-lane, highway with fences on both sides. After pulling 
his vehicle off onto the side of the road, Coleman's only options were to either stay in the car 
and hope that someone would eventually stop or to exit the vehicle and attempt to contact 
someone, who would assist him in moving the vehicle. Coleman made the rather foreseeable 
decision to exit the vehicle and try to obtain help. Because the highway is fenced and the 
nearest telephone was across the street by a service station, he crossed both lanes of traffic, 
climbed the fence and attempted to obtain parts to repair his car. It is clear from a reasoned 
review of the undisputed material facts that the only reason that Coleman was a pedestrian on 
State Road 201 and involved in an accident is due to the fact that his vehicle became inoperable. 
Thus, the accident at issue is clearly and causally related to the ownership, maintenance and use 
of his vehicle. 
Viking's brief seeks to isolate one moment in time, the moment that Coleman trips 
in the road on the way back to his vehicle, and wants this Court to ignore every other 
circumstance surrounding the accident. Indeed, Viking asks this Court to overlook the very 
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reason Coleman was a pedestrian on the road that day, rather than driving home or working at 
his new job. The position that Viking urges this Court to take does not advance the purpose of 
auto insurance, fails to give meaning to the broad terms of the policy issued by Viking and 
ignores pertinent case law from other jurisdictions. 
Throughout Viking's brief, Viking attempts to make distinctions between the cases 
cited by Appellants, Trans Coastal Trucking ("Trans Coastal") and Coleman. The distinctions 
pointed to by Viking are illusory. Thus, this Court should overturn the lower court's entry of 
summary judgment in Viking's favor and find that Viking's policy covers the damages at issue, 
as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE VIKING INSURANCE CONTRACT SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED SO AS TO PROVIDE THE BROADEST COVERAGE POSSIBLE. 
Viking, in its brief, tries to turn this Court's attention away from the well 
reasoned rules of construction long applied to insurance policies in this state, by arguing that, 
because there is a statute which mandates the general language used in the policy, that some 
other standard of interpretation should be applied to the terms of the policy. Clearly, such 
arguments are without merit and the legislature's decision to mandate the use of the broad terms 
contained in the Viking policy only serve to support Appellants' position in this matter. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared, in no uncertain terms, that provisions in 
insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer. Moreover, the insurance 
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contract issued in this case should be construed so as to provide the broadest protection 
reasonably possible given the common understanding of the terms used in the Viking policy. 
See, U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993); P. E. Ashton Co. v. 
Joyner, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965). 
The Viking policy expressly provides coverage for bodily injury and property 
damage that "arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a car." Given the well 
recognized principles of insurance policy construction in this state, which are more fully 
discussed in Appellants' original memorandum, the Viking insurance policy must be construed 
to provide coverage for the accident in question. Clearly, the only reason that Coleman was on 
the highway and involved in an accident that day was because he was attempting to repair his 
stalled vehicle on the side of the road. Thus, it can only be concluded, as a matter of law, that 
the accident, i.e., Coleman's fall while crossing the road to return to his vehicle to wait for the 
parts to be delivered, was directly and causally related to the ownership, maintenance and use 
of his car. Thus, the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to Viking, must be 
overturned and judgment should be granted in Appellants Coleman's and Trans Coastal's favor. 
II. THERE IS A CLEAR CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN 
THE ACCIDENT AND THE USE AND MAINTENANCE OF COLEMAN'S CAR. 
Viking cites a number of cases urging this Court to uphold the District Court's 
decision. However, the cases that Viking cites this Court to are clearly not applicable in that 
they involve facts which are clearly not at issue here. In Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patrick, 819 
3 
P.2d 1233 (Kan. 1991), State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Nol, 699 S.W.2d 156 (Tenn. 1993), and 
Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 866 P.2d 976 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) cases, all the 
accidents involved intentional acts not directly related, in any way, to the maintenance or use 
of the vehicle. Indeed, the Patrick case involved an intentional sexual assault in a vehicle. The 
No I case involved the intentional shooting of patrolmen in their vehicle. Furthermore, in 
Hawkeye, the driver actually exited the vehicle, not because it broke down, not because it needed 
to be repaired or maintained, but for the express and intentional purpose of stopping and/or 
assaulting a bicyclist in question. See, Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 866 P.2d 976 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
Similarly, the Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Batchelder, 421 So.2d 59, 61 
(Fla. App. Dl 1982), case involved the insured driving a truck to a football game and noticing 
bottles rolling out from underneath the seat containing beer. Before arriving at the game, the 
boys were stopped by a police officer for a traffic violation. As the truck came to a stop, the 
bottles again rolled out, but when the plaintiff attempted to secure them, one of the bottles 
exploded, causing injury to the insured's eye. Id. at 61. Clearly, in this case, the storage of 
beer is not causally connected nor is it supposed to be legally connected to the use or 
maintenance of a motor vehicle. 
Likewise, in Chamblee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 922 (Ala. 
1992), the insureds in question had exited the vehicle because they had arrived at their 
destination, where they were going to attend a sporting event. They were not attempting to get 
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back to the car, maintain the car, or use the car. Rather, at the time of the pedestrian/auto 
accident, they were merely trying to cross the street so that they could attend their sports 
activity. 
Finally, in Stucky v. Long, 783 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1989), the insured was 
maintaining an action for injuries sustained after the passengers of the vehicle had left the 
vehicle, and one of the passengers attempted to assault the other. Obviously, the assault activity 
cannot be said to be, in any way, related to the ownership, maintenance or use of that particular 
vehicle. Thus, this particular decision is likewise irrelevant. 
Unlike the case at bar, none of the foregoing cases involved the breakdown of a 
vehicle and the negligent action of it's driver in attempting to obtain parts to repair, maintain 
and operate the vehicle. The cases cited by Appellants in their original brief are much more 
similar to the facts presented to the Court here.1 
Moreover, the hypothetical situations proposed by Viking are likewise not 
analogous. In their hypothetical situations, the accident and injury occur physically far removed 
from the vehicle and the individuals injured are likewise physically removed in time and space 
from the vehicle and its use or repair. On the other hand, in this case, we have an individual, 
1
 Great American Ins. Co. v. Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476 (1990); Oberkramer v. Reliance Ins. 
Co., 650 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App. 1983); Kohl v. Union Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1986); Trinity Universal Ins. 
Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (Colo. 1984); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 455 S.E.2d 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); 
Eichelberger v. Rice, 290 Pa. Super. 269, 434 A.2d 747 (1981); McMichael v. Aetna Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 61 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1994); Morris v. AmericanLiab. & Surety Co., 322 Pa. 91, 185 A. 201 (1936); Chase v. Dunbear, 185 
So.2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pan American Ins. Co., 437 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 
1969). 
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whose car has stalled, who has attempted to repair it, but whose only alternative, because he had 
no car phone, is to contact someone for help in an attempt to move his stalled vehicle. Coleman 
admitted in his deposition that the only reason he was on the road at the time of his fall was for 
the express purpose of obtaining repair parts to make his vehicle operable. There was no 
intervening, independent act of significance that severed the causal connection between 
Coleman's intent to obtain help and repair for his vehicle and the accident in question. 
Accordingly, his activities directly arose out of and were causally connected to the maintenance 
and use of his vehicle at the time of the accident. 
m . THERE ARE NO MEANINGFUL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN 
THE CASE HERE AND THE DECISIONS IN EICHELBERGER AND DAVIS. 
Viking attempts to find meaningless distinctions between the facts in Eichelberger 
v. Rice, 290 Pa. Super. 269, 434 A.2d 747 (1981) and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 455 
S.E.2d 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) and the facts presented here. However, a close review of the 
factual scenario in both cases demonstrate that they are both similar in nature to this case and 
their holdings are applicable to the accident here. In Eichelberger, the insured, who caused the 
accident, was not involved in putting gas in the vehicle, rather she was standing to the front of 
and away from both vehicles, while another individual was putting gas in her gas tank. Most 
important to this case, she was on the highway that day only because her vehicle had become 
inoperable and she was attempting to get help to repair it. Clearly, this is the same situation as 
is presented in this case. 
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Finally, the distinctions that Viking seeks to make, with regard to the facts in 
Davis and facts presented here, are even less persuasive. In Davis, the insured's granddaughter 
was injured after she had sat in the vehicle for some time after her grandmother walked toward 
the store. The child then decided that she wanted to enter the grocery store with her 
grandmother, so that she could get ice cream. Such actions are not clearly related to the use or 
maintenance of the vehicle, but in the Davis case, the court found the exit and parking of the 
vehicle sufficiently closely related to the use of the vehicle, so as to trigger coverage. It is 
apparent that the causal connection between Coleman's accident and the maintenance and use 
of his vehicle is much more direct, than was the connection in Davis. Accordingly, the court's 
decision below should be reversed and judgment in Trans Coastal's and Coleman's favor should 
be entered. 
CONCLUSION 
The only reason that Coleman was on the road as a pedestrian was directly due 
to the fact that his vehicle, insured by Viking, broke down and he was attempting to obtain parts 
for its repair. The terms of the Viking insurance contract are such that the language should be 
given its broadest interpretation. Thus, it can be said, as a matter of law, that Coleman's 
accident arose out of the ownership, maintenance and use of his vehicle. Accordingly, there is 
coverage under the Viking policy and this Court should enter judgment in favor of Trans Coastal 
and Coleman. 
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DATED this i 4 ^ <iay of June, 1996. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
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WKA \L A-WS4-
Barbara K. Berrett 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants, 
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DATED this ' ^ day of June, 1996. 
/ i 
Taylor D. Can-
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants, 
Trans Coastal Trucking and Allen Coleman 
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